Our paper tests the Reduction of Compound Lotteries Axiom in an experiment on tax compliance. Differently to existing theoretical and empirical models, we disentangle the probability of audit, testing it -ceteris paribus -against a more realistic situation with a probability of audit and a subsequent probability of detection of the undeclared income. Various authors have shown that abstract framing in human subject experiments often leads to a violation of the ROCL axiom and also in our framed set-up we do observe statistically significant differences between the two treatments in contrast with the predictions of Expected Utility Theory. Furthermore we find evidence that gender plays a significant role, both with regards to the reduction principle, and in post-audit responses. In the light of our results, we conclude that (1) audit and detection should be considered separately in theoretical and empirical models of tax compliance, (2) dynamic rather than static approaches are preferable in order to account for post-audit responses and (3) gender-specific behavioral patterns should be considered in policy design.
Introduction
How does the reduction of compound lotteries axiom (ROCL henceforth), one of the fundamental underpinnings of expected utility theory, relate to the research field of tax compliance? The answer to this question lies in considering the probability of a random audit and the probability of the evaded tax being detected as two independent entities.
Is the taxpayer indifferent between facing a single compound audit-detection probability and a situation where audit and detection are presented separately? The underlying assumptions of a theoretical model of expected utility which considers only a single general probability p must be either that detection of the undeclared income is guaranteed in the case of an audit, or that taxpayers respect the ROCL axiom. The first relies on the strong conjecture that there is no information asymmetry in the audit procedure, whereas the latter refers to a specific cognitive characteristic of the taxpayer which we aim to test with our study.
Within the literature of tax compliance, the first to provide a theoretical framework were Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Yitzhaki (1974) who developed adapted versions of Becker's (1968) formulation of crime and punishment. In the original Beckerian model the decision whether to commit a crime is driven by economic considerations, with potential outlaws weighing expected benefits in terms of monetary and psychic income against expected costs given by a pecuniary sanction. They are assumed to be homines oeconomici acting in a self-interested and perfectly rational manner. The individuals' decision model proposed by Becker (1968) is nested into a broader social welfare analysis aimed at providing optimal public and private policy responses to criminal behavior. To the best of our knowledge, however, none of the existing theoretical models of expected or non-expected utility that have been developed over the last decades detach audit and detection probabilities formally.
Also the ROCL axiom classifies the decision maker as rational, able and willing to mentally reduce multi-stage compound lotteries into single-stage lotteries by multiplication of probabilities. However, as it has been outlined by numerous academics, such as Bar-Hillel (1973) , Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Harrison et al. (2015) , the axiom does not seem to hold when experimentally tested. Thereupon, a number of alternative approaches have been developed and discussed up to the present (see for example Segal (1990) , Bernasconi and Loomes (1992) , and Tversky and Kahneman (1992) ). Generally, these and similar experiments embed the reduction axiom in a neutral setting in which subjects face a lottery-type choice problem which is presented to them as a gamble. While a sterile context-free approach might on one side be alluring when testing theoretical models, as it allows for a careful control of variables, it is also to be considered that the very lack of a realistic framing might produce results that fail to provide insights for policy impact evaluation. Research that specifically tests context-free against realistic framing has come to contrasting conclusions (see for example Alm et al. (1992) and Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt (2006) versus Laury and Taylor (2008) and Voors et al. (2012) ). With our experimental assessment we take a step forward from "Speaking to Theorists" which happens in standard laboratory environments testing economic theory, towards "Whispering in the Ears of Princes" (Roth, 1987) , where the latter approach is meant to bridge the gap between real policy concerns and theoretical economic models.
To this end, in our study we frame the lottery decision as a choice of tax compliance and divide the overall probability of being audited and detected into one probability of being audited and one separate probability of being detected. Our null hypothesis is that participants behave according to existing economic models of rational choice that view decision makers as being able and willing to reduce compound events to simple ones by applying straightforward algebra. If this hypothesis was accepted, we should not find any treatment effects in the single-stage set-up compared to the two-stage equivalent.
Our results show that subjects do not reduce lotteries according to the reduction axiom and that this effect increases with the overall audit-detection rate. Also, they exhibit a different sensitivity toward audit and detection rate in post-audit and post-fine responses.
Finally, we find significant gender effects that seem to indicate that both, the application of the ROCL axiom and post-audit responses depend on whether the decision maker is male or female.
In section 2 we present the classical models of tax evasion as a starting point and testable null hypothesis. We also introduce the reader to the existing literature on the reduction axiom, its non-expected utility alternatives and its application to our tax compliance case. In section 3 the experiment is described in detail and results are presented in section 4. Besides a direct test of the ROCL axiom, our experimental design also allows for a precise assessment of post-audit responses which are discussed in the regression analyses. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical Background
Tax Evasion
In the classic expected utility maximization problem developed in the seminal article by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) (A-S henceforth) taxpayers decide how much to declare (X) based on two prospects, that are being caught or getting away with evasion:
The first prospect is the situation in which the taxpayer is audited at a probability p.
In this case the authority discovers his full actual amount of income W and will apply a fine π if partial compliance or full evasion is detected. Hence, the taxpayer's actual gross income W is reduced by the taxes he paid on the income he decided to declare, τ X and by the penalty rate π on the undisclosed part of income (W − X). As it is intuitive, the penalty rate π must be higher than the tax rate τ . In the second situation the taxpayer is not audited by the authority, hence getting away with the eventual misdemeanor. In this case she keeps her full actual income W , reduced only by the taxes on the income she decided to declare τ X. The probability of being caught p, the constant tax rate τ and the penalty rate π 1 , as well as the actual income W , are given exogenously in this basic model. Taxpayers are assumed to be risk averse with their marginal utility being everywhere positive and strictly decreasing with U (W ) > 0 and U (W ) < 0.
Thus, if there was no uncertainty about the actions of the tax authority, the maximization problem yields two corner solutions, resulting in the following optimal choices for the only argument X: full compliance (X = W ) in case of a certain audit with p = 1 and total evasion X = 0 if detection is known to be impossible (p = 0). In the intermediate cases where 0 < p < 1 and given the other exogenous parameters, he is expected to find an interior solution for the optimal amount of declared income X. To keep notation clear, we keep on following the lines of A-S, but substitute the two prospects with C (caught) and NC (not caught):
1 Allingham and Sandmo (1972) point out that the penalty rate is assumed to be of pecuniary and not penal nature and that the same τ might be "uncertain from the point of view of the taxpayers", but decide to ignore these points at this level in order to simplify the theoretical analysis.
The first-order condition for the maximization problem (1) can be written as
By rearranging the terms, we obtain the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) and may assess the parameter values for an interior solution to exist:
If the marginal utilities in these two states are equal, such that U (C) = U (N C), then the decision maker is indifferent between being caught and not being caught for every declared amount X, which is exactly when the penalty weighted by the probability of being fined is actuarially equivalent to the tax rate τ :
In this case, the risk-averse taxpayer would choose to declare the full amount of income.
The same would hold true if the probability-weighted fine rate exceeded the tax rate, such that pπ > τ . On the other hand, parameter values for which pπ < τ , with 1 > p > 0 and π > τ , increase the marginal return to undercompliance and the optimal solution will be an interior maximum 2 with 0 < X < W .
In the attempt to bring the model closer to reality and eliminate contradictory results, Yitzhaki (1974) , proposed an approach in which fines are proportional to the amount of evaded taxes instead of the undisclosed proportion of income. In that way, as the tax rate increases cheating is expected to decrease. Taxpayers must therefore maximize the following expected utility function with respect to the income they are going to declare 3 expressed by x: 2 As already mentioned, the assumption of strict concavity of a function f(.) prescribes that it must be strictly decreasing with u (.) < 0. Hence the second-order condition for the solution to be indeed a maximum is satisfied by the strict concavity of the utility function
3 see Andreoni et al. (1998) for a similar mathematical representation.
The baseline value v refers to the net income under the assumption of full compliance v = y(1 − τ ), which is gross income minus taxes. In the case where no audit is performed, the hypothetically correct net income is increased by what we shall call here the cheater's premium, given by the taxes he has not paid on the undeclared part of income. In case of an audit, the evader's correct net income is reduced by the cheater's penalty as she has to pay not only the evaded taxes, but also a fine. The multiplier (fine rate) is given by φ > 1 and it is proportional to the evaded tax τ . The first-order condition for optimal evasion is given by
Again, we compare marginal utilities of the two prospects and find the parameter values for which the taxpayer is indifferent between full compliance and evasion:
As a result, the risk-averse taxpayer will be fully compliant for parameter values pφ ≥ 1, whereas they will find an interior solution optimal as long as pφ < 1. Consequently, given the intuitive condition that the fine has to be as least as high as the evaded amount of tax, i.e. φ > 1, it follows that the audit rate p is strictly smaller than one. For parameter values φ = π/τ the model yields the same solutions as in the A-S set-up 4 .
In the A-S case it is not clear how an increase in the tax rate will impact on the evaded amount, as there are both, an income effect which is due to the decrease of wealth exerting negative pressure on evasion, coupled with a substitution effect. The latter goes 4 The second-order condition is satisfied by the strict concavity of the utility function 11) in the opposite direction making evasion more attractive as the relative price of compliance increases with rising tax rates. The sign of the overall effect ultimately depends on the shape of the utility function. In the Yitzhaki model on the other hand, an increase in the tax rate only leads to a negative income effect, hence under the assumption of decreasing absolute risk aversion, the taxpayer will have less disposable income and prefer to evade less. Both models treat all parameters as orthogonal and exogenously assigned.
Given the decision makers' utility function, the tax authority can thus increase compliance by acting on the fine (rate), the tax rate and the audit probability. A wide body of literature exists on the impact of sanctions and the probability of them to be imposed. Friedland (1982) for example conducted a tax evasion experiment on law students and found that responsiveness to information about threat probability (audit) is higher than to information about threat magnitudes (fines). Furthermore Slemrod et al. (2001) find significant positive reactions in tax compliance as a consequence to information feedback on forthcoming audit probabilities in a controlled experiment on taxpayers from Minnesota. Maciejovsky et al. (2007) , Guala and Mittone (2005) and Choo et al. (2013) study the lagged effect of previous audits on future compliance behavior, finding similar results of negative post-audit responses.
The relevance of sanctions to the tax compliance decision underpins our research idea, which however takes the argument a little more into detail. In case of a random tax audit, it is not always the case that an investigation automatically leads to the detection of the full amount of undeclared income. To accommodate this possibility Feinstein (1991) for example develops a fractional detection model that allows for partial detection and estimates a multiplier of approximately 2 in the U.S. for the TCMP 5 years 1982 and 1985.
That is, if a certain amount of evaded income X is detected, the latent true level of tax evasion is twice as high. In their comprehensive work about tax compliance, Andreoni et al. (1998) address the issue of partial detection in section 7.2. highlighting the resulting bias when classifying taxpayers into honest and cheaters. An explicit distinction between audit rate and detection probability is made by Kleven et al. (2011) who describes evasion behavior in an experiment in Denmark. For third-party reported income, they observed a high level of compliance, whereas evasion was consistent for self-reported income. This difference was described as being due to a lower level of the perceived detection probability for the latter. Also, they conjecture that past audits may have a negative impact on the 5 Tax Compliance Measurement Programs perceived probability of detection. They assume, however, that the overall detection probability is a product of the probability of audit and the probability of detection and that the overall (perceived) detection rate depends on the amount of evaded income. The actual application of a fine may, in fact, depend on a number of different factors, such as transparency of the tax code, efficiency of the tax authority, observability of the taxable income and ultimately also on the cognitive and socio-demographic characteristics of the taxpayer herself. The experimental laboratory represents one approach for the isolation of such effects, and to the best of our knowledge, experiments distinguishing formally between the probability of being audited and the probability of the evaded income being detected by the tax authority have yet to be conducted. As of today, audit and detection are widely used as synonyms within the existing literature on tax compliance decisions.
The Reduction of Compound Lotteries Axiom

The independence axiom and the reduction principle
The reduction principle goes back to the early axiomatization of expected utility of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944, p. 26) and was described by the authors as follows:
"This 6 is the statement that it is irrelevant whether a combination of two constituents is obtained in two successive steps, -first the probabilities α, (1 − α), then the probabilities To describe one example of how the reduction axiom could fail, we extract the comparison between problems 3, 4 and 10 from Kahneman and Tversky (1979) . The decision tasks were presented to the experimental subjects in the following manner:
Problem 3: Choose between a sure outcome of 3000 (X 1 ) and the lottery Y 1 = (4000, 0.8; 0, 0.2)
Problem 4: Choose between the lottery X 2 = (3000, 0.25; 0, 0.75) and the lottery Y 2 = (4000, 0.2; 0, 0.8)
Problem 10: Consider the two-stage game which has a 75% chance of not winning anything and a 25% probability of getting to a second stage. In the latter case you have a choice between getting 3000 (X 1 ) for sure and playing lottery Y 1 = (4000, 0.8; 0, 0.2). The choice must be made before the game starts.
The problems can be represented as decision trees in figure 1. Problems 3 and 4 were answered by 95 subjects, out of which 80% preferred the sure option X 1 of problem 3, whereas 65% chose Y 2 over X 2 in problem 4 7 . By considering that the trees in problem 4 are the reduced forms of the lotteries displayed in problem 10, we can immediately spot visually that the (mixture) independence axiom of expected utility was not satisfied 8 .
According to the mixture independence axiom, if X Y then this preference relation must also hold if both prospects are convexly combined with a common Z, such that pX + (1 − p)Z pY + (1 − p)Z. In the example of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) , given that X 1 Y 1 , their convex combination (0.25, 0.75) with Z, which in this case is given by the degenerate lottery (0, 1) at the bottom 75% branch, should produce the preference relation X 2 Y 2 . This violation of EUT is called the common ratio effect (Cubitt et al., 1998; Nebout and Dubois, 2014) and could be explained by a preference for certainty in the reported example 9 . The ROCL axiom, on the other hand, requires individuals to be indifferent between the lottery A (B) of problem 10 and the single-stage counterpart X 2 (Y 2 ) of problem 4. Yet, of 141 participants, 78% chose option A over option B, which is clearly inconsistent with the preferences elicited in problem 4. The ROCL axiom was 7 The authors observe a reflection effect where results are mirrored when the experiment is conducted with losses instead of gains, which is consistent with the predictions of Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) 8 In order to be able to distinguish between the two different types of independence axioms for singlestage and two-stage lotteries, Segal (1990) introduces the compound independence axiom for the latter, whereas mixture independence refers to the independence axiom in the classical von Neumann-Morgenstern sense. 9 Kahneman and Tversky (1979) interpret the preference reversal as certainty effect. therefore violated, with the two-stage lottery B not being evaluated in the same manner as its actuarially equivalent single-stage counterpart Y 2 . Figure 1 : Decision trees and preferences of problems 3, 4 and 10 of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) However, the choices of problem 10 are consistent with those of problem 3, which means that in the case of a salient (common) first stage, individuals seem to behave consistently with the predictions of the compound independence axiom (CIA henceforth). Kahneman and Tversky (1979) conjecture an isolation effect when their subjects attach the same preferences to Problem 10 as to problem 3. In other words, they mentally eliminate the common part given by {(0.75, (.); 0.25, Z)} and concentrate only on the two respective sub-lotteries, that are equal to X 1 and Y 1 .
As explained in depth by Segal (1990) , the mixture independence axiom can only be considered valid if both, the CIA and the ROCL are jointly respected. The same author suggests in a dedicated chapter (Segal, 1992 ) that the mechanism with which people reduce two-stage lotteries is that of the CIA, in particular by the technique of substitution of certainty equivalents. Moreover, and for that very reason, he concludes that CIA and ROCL are not compatible in the same analysis of compound events as they refer to two distinct ways of reducing subsequent stochastic stages. Machina (1989) provides an extensive survey of the most common examples of violations of the independence axiom applied to two-stage lotteries. However, he assumes ROCL to hold and interprets the failure of the mixture independence axiom as a direct consequence of the CIA. Numerous other authors, such as Bar-Hillel (1973) , Segal (1987) Bernasconi (1992), Starmer and Sugden (1991) , Nebout and Dubois (2014) and Harrison et al. (2015) found that ROCL does not hold and a number of alternative approaches have been developed in order to accommodate such findings.
Alternative two-stage evaluation functionals
We have already mentioned one model which was introduced by Segal (1987) and consists in a folding-back technique which starts at the final tree nodes. The decision maker substitutes the lotteries at the final branches with their certainty equivalents, ending up with simple lotteries to be evaluated. If the decision maker is indifferent between a simple lottery and its certainty equivalent, the CIA is satisfied, but the same cannot be said about ROCL. By transforming probabilities according to the anticipated (rankdependent) utility theory of Quiggin (1982) , he shows how ROCL becomes just a special case when the probability transformation function g(p) is linear. The advantage of this model is that it can account for pessimism and optimism, i.e. it can assign higher (lower) weights to extreme probabilistic values. The procedure consists in ranking the outcomes from lowest to highest, such that
The lottery X is evaluated by adapting outcomes with a utility function u(x) and by weighing probabilities with g(p), where g(0) = 0 and g(1) = 1:
As the weighting function g(.) is applied to the cumulative probability distribution, another property of this model is that first-order stochastic dominance is not violated. Segal (1990) also discusses a weaker alternative to the reduction axiom when comparing twostage lotteries, which is given by the compound dominance axioms. Strong compound (stochastic) dominance is implied by ROCL whereas the converse is not true.
The advantages of rank-dependent utility were taken up also by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) who further developed Prospect Theory into a more elaborate Cumulative Prospect Theory. By allowing for utility functions to behave differently based on whether the decision maker feels to be in the loss or in the gain domain with respect to their reference point, it offers an even more flexible tool able to account for non-expected utility deviations due to different behavioral and psychological drivers. On similar lines, also
Regret Theory by Loomes and Sugden (1982) allows for the possibility of subjective probability distortions and conjectures that the decision maker elaborates prospects based on the ex-ante juxtaposition of expected regret and rejoice once the lottery is over.
Our testable null hypothesis is that decision makers behave in line with the axioms of expected utility theory by being indifferent in terms of declared income between the following single-stage and the two-stage environment:
The focus of our study is therefore to assess whether p = αβ. Our alternative hypothesis is that the ROCL axiom is violated in which case we would observe compliance rates that differ in the one-stage with respect to the two-stage treatment. In conclusion of this section, assuming that the tax auditor is not perfect in detecting the evaded amount of income, the theoretical and empirical representation of the audit/detection mechanism as one single probability within an expected utility framework requires the strong assumption of ROCL. As we have seen, when applied to lottery experiments, this is most of the times not the case. Our experiments specifically tests for the ROCL axiom in a tax compliance setting and -in case the null hypothesis was to be rejected -calls for a reconsideration on how tax evasion is modeled.
profits were converted at a rate of 180 ECU= 1e. We opted for a pay-off mechanism that rewards each single period as opposed to a random-lottery incentive procedure. Problems relating to potential biases that could arise with the use of random-lottery incentive mechanisms (RLIM henceforth) have been analyzed by scholars such as Starmer and Sugden (1991) , Harrison and Swarthout (2014) and Harrison et al. (2015) . The "1-in-K" payment method, where K > 1, might potentially create distortions when basic axioms of decision theory are experimentally tested, which is due to the fact that a procedure that randomly draws one period to be paid out to the subjects at the end of the experiment adds an additional stage to the lottery choice task and might influence the decision of the subject. 12 In his work about preference reversals and the independence axiom, Holt (1986) describes how the use of a RLIM could lead to a preference reversal if the independence axiom is not satisfied. This reversal is due to a "dilution" of choices as a consequence of the additional probabilistic stage. He also concludes that the RLIM does not elicit true preferences if the reduction principle holds. In conclusion, as we were conducting an exploratory experiment in which the very test of the ROCL axiom was the focus of our study, we could therefore not assume ex ante that the independence axiom was valid, hence implementing RLIM beforehand would have been somewhat "bipolar" in our case (see Harrison and Swarthout (2014) for an interpretation of the term in this context).
Overall, we conducted six different sessions, suitable for between-subject analyses.
After period 14, participants were provided with a new set of instructions. Those who just concluded the one-stage (two-stage) treatment then had to decide in a two-stage (onestage) environment respectively. In that way we also gathered data for within-subject assessments.
12 The laboratory experiment conducted in Harrison et al. (2015) consisted of two different treatments. The first group was presented with a battery of 40 different choices between a single-stage lottery and its two-stage counterpart. Here a "1-in-40" RLIM was used which randomly drew one of the 40 lottery outcomes for final payment. The second group had to solve a one-shot choice problem which was drawn randomly from the battery of 40 pairs, the lottery was played and they were paid with the "1-in-1" payment protocol. Harrison et al. (2015) found no violation of the ROCL axiom in the "1-in-1" subject group, whereas ROCL was violated in the "1-in-40" treatment. As the authors state themselves, this could also be due to other drivers than the incentive mechanism, such as the lack of time inducing the first subject group to choose faster hence think less about the reduction of compound lotteries. The ROCL principle does not hold in the experiment conducted by Starmer and Sugden (1991) which leads the authors to conclude that "experimental researchers need not be too concerned about this particular [RLIM] problem".
Experimental parameters
The tax rate τ and the fine rate φ were held constant at 30% and twice the evaded taxes respectively, whereas the overall probability of being detected was either 10%, 20% or 30% in compound terms. In each session participants played both, the one-stage and the two-stage task for fourteen rounds each, but with different compound probabilities for a total of 28 rounds. Our subjects were not told how many rounds and treatments they were about to play as by keeping some degree of uncertainty about the time horizon we wanted to reduce endgame effects to a minimum. The phenomenon of extreme choices at the very end of experiments has been observed by Selten and Stoecker (1986) and analyzed more in-depth by Reuben and Suetens (2012) . However, it appears to occur mainly in experiments characterized by past and/or future interaction between participants. Even though our subjects do not interact in any way, we wanted to be on the safe side, as one potential endgame effect in this context could have been the temptation to perform some kind of extreme actions towards the end of the experiment. 
Procedures and Experimental Flow
To enhance realism and consistency of our experimental design and to minimize potential latent cultural confounders (see for example Alm and Torgler (2006) for a cross-country study on differing levels of tax morale), particular attention was paid to the use of the Italian language throughout the entire process of recruitment, instruction and experimental programming. We selected only those subjects with fluency in Italian and contacted them on-line through an internal platform inviting them to register for a paid experiment on individual decision making at the Ca' Foscari Laboratory for Experimental Economics in Venice, Italy. Our final subject pool consisted of 95 participants, most of them from Ca' Foscari undergraduate and master programs, who were then divided into six different groups.
At the beginning of each session, subjects were asked to take a seat in front of one of the laboratory computers, each of them separated by cardboard dividers in order to prevent participants from being observed or from seeing what others were doing. Once seated in their cubicles, they were invited to read the paper instructions carefully. In addition, the instructions were also read out loud by the experimenter. Figure 2 depicts the experimental flow of the 2-stage treatment 13 .
On the first screen of the experiment subjects were informed about their gross income of that period and asked to take a decision about the part of income they intended to declare. They were also provided with a calculator which they could access by clicking on the corresponding icon on the bottom left of the screen. Once the report was successfully submitted, a random draw n α (n p in the one-stage treatment) from 0 to 1 determined whether an audit was to be performed. If n α > α (n p > p), no audit was performed and subjects in both treatments were shown their final result given by their gross income minus the taxes calculated on the declared amount. An audit was performed whenever n α < α (n p < p) in which case a blinking text lasting 8 seconds appeared on the screen informing the participant of an audit in progress. In the one-stage treatment, if no evasion was detected, the final outcome of the period -gross income minus taxes -was displayed.
If, on the other hand, the declared amount was discovered to be lower than the actual gross income, they were shown a summary containing the sanction resulting from the audit. In the two-stage treatment, a second background process draws a new random number n β between 0 and 1. In the cases where n β was lower than the detection rate β and the declared amount X resulted to be lower than the gross income Y , the undeclared income was considered detected and the participant was shown the screen containing the sanction. In the case of n β > β or full compliance X = Y they were informed that no anomalies had been found in their returns and shown a summary containing also a field for a possible sanction, which equaled zero in this case. At the end of the experiment, all participants were asked to compile a short questionnaire on demographics, risk aversion, fiscal understanding and beliefs 14 .
13 The original experiment was conducted in Italian, the English translation is provided merely for an illustrative purpose.
14 Questionnaire available upon request 
Mean compliance rates
We have collected a total of 2660 income reports handed in by 95 subjects over 28 periods.
The compliance rate was calculated as the ratio between declared income and total gross income. Under the assumption of risk neutrality a utility-maximizing agent should declare zero income, but nearly one third of all income reports, 29% (767 reports) were honest, fully declaring the assigned gross income, whereas around the same percentage, 27% (729 reports) declared zero income.
The histogram of all compliance rates is reported on the left side of figure 3. The highlights an average tendency towards declaring more than 50% of gross income. In other words, as the compound percentage level increases, the average compliance rates become significantly higher when subjects are asked to reason with two distinct probabilities, one for the audit rate and one for the detection rate, as opposed to when 15 A t-test is not applicable as compliance rates are bounded between 0 and 1 and can thus not be assumed to be normally distributed. The Shapiro-Wilk test of normality clearly rejects the a normal distribution.
they are confronted with only one single rate of audit with automatic detection, though both of them yield the same in compound terms, hence indicating a violation of the ROCL axiom.
In the second phase non-parametric differences in means between the one-stage and the two-stage treatment are not significant anymore, which could indicate a learning effect induced by the administration of the second treatment. By being given a similar, yet slightly different set-up, they could have understood our final purpose and decided to take a major computational effort. What is interesting to observe, is that the mean compliance rates of the first phase (see table 2, 1st phase versus 2nd phase) are significantly different, with a compliance level that increases with higher compound detection rates. In appendix A we report a graphical representation of the level of compliance for each individual in the 28 periods. Somewhat not surprisingly, a Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test shows that within-subject means of the two phases are not the same.
Period-wise analysis
As a next step we look at our experimental data from a period-wise perspective. The upper set of graphs in figure 4 compares the average compliance rates for each decision period of the one-stage to the two-stage treatment for all three compound parameter values, 10%, 20% and 30% considering only phase 1 (1330 reports).
Differences between the period averages of the two-stage treatment and the one-stage control are displayed in the lower set of figures. Differences in absolute terms between compliance rates over time are not statistically significant for the 10% and the 20% treatment levels though the latter exhibits noisier behavior. However, a sharp and highly significant shift is observed for the 30% treatment where compliance in the two-stage set-up is around 25% higher (p=0.001).
The graphical representation of the average compliance rates per period in phase 2 (figure 5) confirms that there is an increase in compliance for higher audit rates. However, compliance does not differ significantly between treatment and control groups, indicating that no ROCL violations were detectable in the second phase.
Regression analysis
For our regression analyses we chose a random-effects Tobit Model, which is able to account for individual-specific effects, with the dependent variable Reported Income being censored from the left at zero and from the right at the gross income endowment of the period. Moreover, we excluded a total of three policy-inert participants who always declared their full income in each of the 28 periods they played, assuming they have a strong intrinsic motivation for their standardized behavior and are thus not affected by policy 16 . With the coefficient of Caught evading in (t-1) we capture the effect of those partial compliers that were detected and had to pay a fine in the previous period (t-1). The 2-stage dummy variable is our treatment variable and takes value 1 when the subject was asked to decide in the two-stage environment and 0 for the one-stage set-up.
Econ Discipline identifies those who have a study background in economics. Compound detection rate refers to the overall final detection probability, which is given by p in the one-stage treatment and α * β in the two-stage treatment with values 10%, 20% and 30%.
The time trend over all periods is identified by the variable Time and the level of risk propensity was elicited in the final questionnaire. We asked a general risk question as in Dohmen et al. (2011) , i.e. "How do you deal with potentially risky situations?". Our variable ranges from 1 (I always avoid risky situations and choose the safer option) to 7 (I am willing to take risks and always choose the riskier option). We also control for the amount of time spent to take the compliance decision, which is given by Seconds to Compliance Decision. Summary statistics for all variables are reported in Appendix B.
Regression analysis of the periods 1-14 (phase 1)
As a first step we considered only the data from phase 1, i.e., the first 14 time periods with a total of 1260 income reports with the results of our analysis being reported in table 3. We begin by controlling for income, which varied within a range of 80 to 160 ECU in each period in order to avoid boredom during the experiment. The effect is small and positive, yet not highly significant. The impact of a detection in the previous period is negative and significant, reflecting similar findings of Mittone (2006) and Maciejovsky et al. (2007) . This post-audit response might be due to the "Bomb Crater Effect". This effect is a form of "backwards gambler's fallacy". The reason why the two phenomena are not the same is described in Mittone (2006) , p 824, who defines the gambler's fallacy (GF) as follows:
"The GF is related to a form of distortion produced by the subjects' perception of the probability distribution of an uncertain event, due to specific sequences of observations. For example, imagine that a gambler is betting on red or black in roulette. After a long sequence of black, her/his expectancy of the occurrence of red increases. As well known, the probability of red and black is always the same, independently from any possible sequence of occurrences, but the gambler feels that the red becomes increasingly more likely." The Bomb Crater Effect, on the other hand, describes soldiers in wartimes hiding in bomb craters because they believe that where a bomb hits once it does not hit twice. According to this mechanism, the subjective distortion of the likelihood of events exhibiting in reality invariant objective probabilities, would therefore induce our subjects to think that two subsequent audits are near to impossible. Our data would be in-line with such a hypothesis as we observe a sharp decrease in compliance right after an audit.
A complementary behavioral mechanism explaining our results could be the urge for "loss repair" which is also studied by Maciejovsky et al. (2007) and mentioned in Andreoni et al. (1998) . Again Maciejovsky et al. (2007) make an attempt to disentangle misperception of chance from loss repair, but we will return to this topic in the dedicated section 4.3.4 of the paper. For now, it is interesting to note how the significant effect after the experience of having been caught and the payment of a fine seems to be significant only for our male participants, as shown in the interaction coefficients with gender in the appendix C.2. Also, we do not observed lagged effects that exceed the first period immediately after a fine was paid. The core of our research, however, was to test whether subjects are indifferent between being presented with a one-stage tax compliance problem as opposed to its two-stage counterpart. Our regression analysis ultimately confirms that the ROCL Axiom is indeed violated, with the variable 2-stage exhibiting a strongly positive effect on tax compliance. Even though expected utility theory would predict rational decision makers to be indifferent, our participants declare a significantly higher amount in the 2-stage setting, as opposed to the 1-stage equivalent. Again, when interacting the treatment variable with gender (see appendix C.2 for regression results) we find the somewhat puzzling result of the ROCL axiom being violated only by female subjects.
Not surprisingly, our data also confirms some significant stylized results: the overall probability of getting caught evading taxes, i.e., the compound detection rate, affects compliance positively, withal we observe a negative time trend. Ceteris paribus individuals with a more positive attitude toward risk declare less, which is in line with previous studies, such as Bazart and Bonein (2014) and Bernasconi et al. (2014) . Also, dedicating more time to the compliance decision seems to increase overall tax compliance, though only by a very small amount. We do not find any evidence of women declaring overall more of their income, which is in contrast to the findings of Torgler and Valev (2010) that women have a higher aversion towards tax evasion and corruption. This result is robust even when we do not control for risk attitude (results reported in model (3)). As expected, having an economics background reduces tax compliance, which is likely to be due to a higher level of training and not to a different level of tax morale. Overall, our sample does not seem to be driven by tax morale at all when deciding about how much to declare.
Out of curiosity and to round up the discussion, we also conducted a separate Ordinal Logit analysis in order to verify the findings of (Rubinstein, 2006b,a) as they found mixed results with respect to profit-maximizing attitudes and quantitative skills of economics students. What emerges clearly from his experiments is that students with training in economics exhibit a significantly higher overall zeal towards profit maximization regardless of the moral implications of their choices. However, in a comparative analysis of a choice that requires some mathematical skills, their answers did not differ with respect to other study disciplines. Given these findings, we too might face difficulties in interpreting the compliance level of economics students as this could be due to their level of tax morale, their quantitative skills or both. In our analysis (see full table in C.1) subjects with a background in economics did not have a different level of tax morale. Moreover, we found that women are significantly more likely to have a higher level of tax morale, whereas when taxes are perceived as unfair, tax morale decreases which accords with Alm and Torgler (2006) . In the alternative models (2)-(4) we added a set of additional determinants of tax compliance: tax morale, perceived tax fairness and gender. The deterrent variable Tax Morale was determined by asking participants whether or not they agree that paying taxes depends on the individual level of morale. A higher level of tax morale should affect compliance positively (see for example Torgler (2002) and Torgler and Schneider (2007) ).
Conversely, the inverse of perceived tax fairness is measured by the variable Taxes too high which is given by the difference between what an individual believes to be the tax rate his or her family unit has to pay on their income and the tax rate he or she considers to be fair. If individuals perceive the tax burden as being too high, we should observe a lower level of overall compliance, as shown also by Andreoni et al. (1998) . Finally, we also control for gender with the variable Female. However, empirical findings in existing literature appear to be mixed (see Kastlunger et al. (2010) and references therein).
Regression analysis of the periods 15-28 (phase 2)
When repeating the same analysis in the second phase (within-subject treatment variations, period 15-28) we find some interesting results in dynamic terms, as shown in table 6. As predicted by our non-parametric assessment, the sensitivity to audit rates increases significantly in the second phase. Moreover, as the experiment went on, the linear time trend disappears. The effect of a previous fine is stable over time and significant also in the second phase, and again only the male participants are responsible for the negative post-audit response. However, the significance of our 2-stage variable completely vanishes -for both sexes.
One explanation for this non-result in the second phase could be numeracy learning.
Even though we presented the subjects with both, probabilities and ratios in order to avoid the numeracy bias described by Reyna and Brainerd (2008) , it could be the case that in the second phase participants improved their calculation skills which ultimately resulted in the ROCL not being violated. Also, they could have simply understood our experiment as they went on to the second phase and were presented with a two-stage (one-stage) decision problem, but having faced a one-stage (two-stage) environment in the previous phase. Furthermore, our student subject pool could be less affected by social norms on tax compliance and sanctioning, thus exhibiting overall weaker effects, similarly to the findings of Choo et al. (2014) . Finally, an alternative explanation for the difference between the two phases could lie in latent effects of non-linear probability weighting functionals evolving over time. Under this hypothesis, subjects do not suddenly switch from being a non-expected utility maximizer to a rational choice type, but they adjust their weighting functions dynamically. In the second phase they still apply weighting functions, but for reasons still to be determined, they become linear making subjects appear as expected utility maximizers with the two-stage variable not being significant anymore.
Furthermore, with all subjects learning over time, we also see how the competitive advantage of an ex-ante quantitative literacy disappears with Econ Discipline being not relevant anymore. Finally, the constant term looses most of its significance, indicating that the intrinsically motivated compliance level disappears in favor of mechanisms based on individual cognitive characteristics and risk preferences.
A Panel Hurdle Model with censoring and tremble
In this section we present a robustness analysis which represents a more elegant way to account for fully compliant subjects than the somewhat brute-force method we applied in the previous tobit analyses which consisted in excluding the fully compliant types ex ante from the analysis. Differently, in the panel double-hurdle model (see Moffatt (2015) , Engel and Moffat (2012) , Engel and Moffat (2014) and references therein) a fully compliant subject is classified as a "type". To be classified as a potential evader they have to pass a first hurdle before actually being included in the analysis. Our first hurdle is defined as follows 17 : N (0, 1) where d * i = 1 if the subject is found to have had at least one event of evasion in the 28 periods and equals zero otherwise.
The second hurdle consists in a censored regression model which is very similar to the tobit model and we use the evasion rate (income − x)/income as the dependent variable, which is censored at 0 and 1 with subject-specific random effects captured by u i .
The observed data is therefore defined as follows:
Considering our specific analysis we wanted to define a Fully-compliant-Type with less restrictive rules than full compliance in each period, i.e. with a cumulative evasion rate of zero. To do so, we used a specification that allows for a tremble parameter ω. In other words, we allow for the possibility of small errors, or some evasion occurrences made by mistake. Figure 6 displays the posterior probabilities of being a fully-compliant type with the number of number of times they evaded throughout the 28 period on the x-axis. The tremble parameter ω which was activated on the right side of the figure is compared to the simple model fully-compliant types are classified as such when they never evaded. In our example we used a tremble parameter of 0.02 which is the probability of the participant experiencing a deviance from their natural type due to an error. The idea behind this choice is that of accounting for negligence during the reporting process. These cases are often treated differently in terms of sanctions (see for example Snow and Warren (2005) and Andreoni et al. (1998) bringing the case of the US where fraud has a substantially higher penalty rate compared to non-fraudulent or negligent cases of under-compliance. An extension of the hurdle model to a set-up that can accommodate two types, the Total-evader-type and the Fully-compliant-Type is a possibility we wish to explore in future studies whereas for the purpose of the current dataset one first hurdle is sufficiently representative. With the permission of the author, we use an adapted version of the codes for panel double hurdle models contained in Moffatt (2015) , pp. 264-282 18 . Table   5 compares three different models: the classical panel tobit model (1), similarly to what we have already shown earlier and two panel double hurdle models in (2) 
The Bomb Crater Effect and Loss Repair
In the attempt to get a better insight into the interplay between the "Bomb Crater
Effect" and the loss repair mechanism we conducted a third analysis. To isolate the two coefficients, we concentrate our third regression models only on those subjects that were administered the two-stage treatment as shown in table 6.
We then disentangle the effects of having been detected in the preceding period and the reaction due to an audit only without having been detected, where the latter is done to account for effects that are due to the mere excitement experienced with an audit. For the two variables Caught evading taxes in (t-1) and Not caught evading taxes in (t-1) we consider only partial compliers. For this analysis we included all two-stage experiments into our regression, those from the first and those from the second phase for a total of 1260 observations, divided into six treatment groups.
When partial compliers were only audited, but not caught evading, the tax audit has not been successful, they did not have to pay a fine and therefore there was no motivation for loss repair. The negative reaction in this case is a pure "Bomb Crater Effect" (BCE) in reference to the first-stage audit probability only. The negative reaction after a detection and payment of a fine on the other hand cannot be easily split, as it includes a stacked BCE ascribable also to the second probability stage, as well as the urge for "loss repair".
It seems that the fact of having been caught is stronger than that of an audit only, but a
Wald test performed to test the difference in coefficients fails to reject the null hypothesis of equality (Prob > chi2 = 0.1589). The implication of this result is that the negative post-audit effect is likely to be ascribable mainly to the BCE of the audit itself. The loss repair mechanism as a consequence of experienced fines seems to be negligible when looking at the aggregate data. The gender split in table 11 in the appendix shows that both sexes have a negative post-audit reaction and that the response is equivalent in size and significance. However, when looking at the post-fine behavior, the negative effect for women disappears whereas the male reaction doubles and becomes strongly significant.
This indicates that a bomb crater effect and loss repair are likely to play a role in postfine responses of males. Also, it seems that the experience of a fine in the previous period cancels out the bomb crater effect of the audit for women which translates into an unaffected level of post-fine compliance.
Concluding notes
With the experimental assessment described in this paper we aimed to test the reduction of compound lotteries axiom by using the classical models of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Yitzhaki (1974) of tax evasion. Agents are assumed to be rational expected utility maximizers, who take decisions based on the probability of getting caught in a random audit. Yitzhaki's representation of the tax compliance decision has been challenged numerous times and, similarly to lottery games in the standard expected utility framework, a number of alternative approaches have been proposed. Nonetheless, we needed to go back to the classic model in order to test one very specific axiom of expected utility theory in this context: the reduction of compound lotteries axiom. The inspirational trigger for our assessment lied in considering two separate probability types that enter an individual's decision problem. There is the audit rate on one hand and, conditional on having been audited, we allow for a detection rate. Traditional utility-maximizing models consider only one compound audit/detection rate and we wanted to know whether or not these two stages are reduced following the reduction of compound lotteries axiom and can thus be considered equivalents in theoretical modeling.
We conducted an exploratory tax compliance experiment in order to determine the level of individual compliance in the one-stage control treatment compared to the twostage setting, where for the latter the overall probability was split into one probability of being subject to an audit and another probability of being actually detected. In the first phase, our null hypothesis is rejected with participants declaring significantly amount in the two-stage experiment, which is confirmed by both, parametric and non-parametric analyses. More in detail, violations of the ROCL axiom are observed in the female subject pool only and become stronger as the joint probability level of being audited and detected increases. In the second phase the reduction axiom is not violated anymore and compliance in both treatment groups converges to one level. The pattern that emerges is that over time the only determinants of the compliance decision are the level of compound detection (10%, 20% or 30%), the time spend to come to the compliance decision and audit events in the previous period.
Concerning post-audit and post-detection responses, we find that reactions to fines are strong and significant, but also that the sole experience of having been audited impacts negatively on compliance in the subsequent period. The separation between past 'audit only' versus past detection experiences allows us to show that there are two separate drivers at work, the Bomb Crater Effect and the need for loss-repair. Also, there are significant differences in gender with females having the same post-audit reactions as men but no significant post-fine responses. Males on the other hand exhibit a highly significant and strongly negative post-fine reaction in compliance which could be an indication of an underlying loss-repair mechanism 19 .
Outside the laboratory, however, the perceived detection rate of undeclared income is likely to be influenced by multiple factors such as the credibility of institutional efficiency, the level of self-evaluation and exogenous institutional determinants. In a laboratory experiment, where subjects are aware that a computer instead of a real auditor is taking these decisions there are only limited chances to capture the full impact of the detection rate (see also (Alm et al., 1992) ). We therefore suggest culturally nested field experiments as a method to assess how subjective expectations of detection rates affect the level of tax evasion.
Our results add another piece to the complex picture describing the decision-making process of paying taxes. More precisely, it provides support to the argument that the reduction of compound lotteries axiom is violated, which and makes the case for a revision of classical models describing tax compliance. Hence, formal models should consider the audit and the detection rate separately in order to be able to account for their different sensitivity.
We also presented a number of alternative utility specifications and approaches that can be extended to a two-stage setting when modeling tax compliance behavior without relying on the ROCL axiom. Among these approaches we find the substitution of certainty equivalents (Segal, 1992) , Cumulative Prospect Theory with rank-dependent utility functions (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) or the possibility of relaxing the assumption of time indifference by adding elements of suspense, as already suggested by Samuelson (1952) .
Besides behavioral drivers that diverge from the expected utility framework, violations of the reduction axiom could also be simply due to the more complex situation of having to evaluate two probability stages which go beyond the numeracy bias we mentioned earlier. Keller (1985) finds for example that the reduction axiom holds more frequently when decision problems are presented with tubes and marbles. This could be a further interesting point to be tested in future research. If it is found that the mere increase in quantitative complexity is the responsible executioner of the reduction axiom, then it must be assessed how individuals evaluate such complex situations. Tax compliance situations are indeed typically of complex nature with a high level of ambiguity attached to probabilities and with taxpayers that on average have not received intensive quantitative training before deciding on their compliance level.
Finally, we recommend the two probability stages not to be aggregated in a theoretical model, the use of dynamic instead of static approaches able to account for lagged reactions and the careful consideration of behavioral gender difference. As a policy message which already emerges from our experimental results is "If you audit, do it well". The negative effect after an unsuccessful audit should not be disregarded in the cost-benefit analysis of the tax authority. One possible approach to minimize negative post-audit and postsanction effects could be pre-announcing the audit. The latter was found to have a positive effect on tax compliance within the same time frame (Slemrod et al., 2001) and this might partly neutralize the decrease in compliance in the ensuing periods.
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